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Abstract 
Transition economics was and still is a topic mostly associated with the post-communist countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The cause of its emergence as a theory was not purely economic – 
the spearhead was politics – leading to the collapse of the Eastern Block, to be followed by the disintegration 
of three federal states: Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, with many civil wars and ethnic 
conflicts. The experience proved a relaxation to the Western liberal developed democracies as it 
strengthened the belief of their superior model which the transition economies want to embrace. First of all, 
the transition provided a new opportunity for interaction between European East and West. On the eve of 
its 30th anniversary, with more than half of these countries experiencing “the end of transition” and joining 
the European Union (EU) while the rest considered not yet meeting the “standards”, another transition is 
on the way, and this one not going into but coming out from the EU, Brexit respectively. Just like in former 
communist countries, it too, originated from politics, namely the results of 23.06.2016 referendum results 
that decided for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU, a move that is about to force 
considerable changes in the economy, already labelled as “transition.” Although an intensive phase of 
research and debate is underway, the aim of this paper is to explore the implications of Brexit in terms of 
its international economics and contribute to a more general theory of transition economics which so far 
has been reserved for, and as a reference to, post-communist countries in CEE.     
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“Brexit” is a term formed by the name British and word exit to denote the withdrawal of 
the UK from the EU. The term was coined even before it actually came into being for 
implementation. Since then, the period leading to effective or full withdrawal until 31.12.2020 has 
been referred to as transition. What is it meant by this transition and does it really ends on the date 
agreed upon? 
Transition is a very broad concept with a number of meanings depending on which area 
and context applies, but this discussion paper will be focused on its relevance to post-communist 
countries and the UK after Brexit. When the results of the referendum were announced and the 
“leave” option won, it made many multinational companies operating in the UK rethink their 
strategies, despite that it would take one year (until 31.12.2020) for the “leave” to enter into force 
or become effective, a period known as transition out of the EU. What does this transition imply? 
Transition by general definition implies a process of changing from one state to another or 
going through a process or stage. It is used and applied in many areas, circumstances, conditions, 
subjects and time. In former communist countries of CEE this was understood as a process from 
communist rule and command economy to democracy and a market economy. Brexit may be 
similar to the period of transition in CEE, excluding political disorganization from communism to 
democracy. As the CEE needed an approximate time from one-party system to the first multi-party 
democratic elections, so did the UK in negotiating the deal of Brexit with the EU on one hand and 
free trade agreements (FTA) with each EU member on the other hand. In both cases (CEE and 
Brexit) this can be considered as an emerging transition. The real transition, however, begins later 
and lasts longer. This is what actually happened in CEE while in the UK it remains to be seen. 
Brexit as a political and economic process is viewed as one of the major developments in 
the UK’s modern history since it joined the EU on 01.01.1973. Getting out of it is referred to and 
widely accepted as transition, but not at the time of UK joining the European Economic 
Community, most likely because it was seen as an easygoing development or evolution towards 
economic integration. If the process of getting out is transition, could entering into the EU also be 
called so, just as the term became historically famous for CEE? In literal terms, it may be similar, 
though in practical development is fundamentally different. The UK did not need to go through 
massive political and economic disorganization like the CEE did; it joined the EU just as the EU 
became part of the UK, thus it was a co-integration. The CEE needed time, transformation and 
transition in order to meet certain criteria for EU integration. It was a transition from centrally 
planned to an open market economy, a fully-fledged of which took at least one decade in many 
and even more in some of the former communist economies.  
The CEE countries embarked on a massive scale of economic reforms in the early 1990s 
as part of their transformation from largely state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and economy to an 
open market economy. They realized this to be a transformation which involved privatization of 
SOEs, something which the UK did it with her own public companies in the 1980s. As it took 
much more time than they expected, in the first half of 1990s it actually transformed the economy 
into a poorer performance by causing recession. Despite being an unexpected transformation, it 
had to go on to what they desired – a fully operational and developed market economy, or yet 
another transformation in one journey, the first half of which was backward (recession) and the 
remaining upward (economic growth). In any case, the whole experiment is identified as (one) 
transformation without the two phases referred to (recession and growth) which it involved. They 
first went for transformation, and what they experienced became known in the mainstream theory 
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of transition economics as a transition process. When is this transition over? That is not a question 
having an easy answer, which this discussion paper will try to provide, as it also questions the 
nature of transition for Brexit. If the transition period lasts until 31.12.2020, where the UK is still 
normally part of the EU and much of the things remain in place, then in effect it is not transition; 
the real transition begins after. The experience from the CEE has shown that transition cannot 
happen overnight and it takes years in implementation. Brexit is a kind of transition through 
democracy where political and economic system remain unchanged. It is taken by caution, 
uncertainty with warnings in advance what is about to happen, a feeling which most likely is 
affected by the experience and lessons learned from the transition in CEE. A considerable number 
of causes were addressed to the UK leaving the EU, and they are complex. Since it has joined the 
union in 1973 until her leave, the UK’s position was somehow specific as it intended deliberately 
to stay out of the Eurozone and the Schengen area. In general, Brexit was or is a consequence and 
result of what is known across the EU as Euroscepticism, a phenomenon or move opposing 
European integration and the EU. 
 
2. Theories of economic transformation and transition  
 
In economics, transformation historically is associated with transition. Moreover, the time 
of one is dictated or conditioned by the other, and they often evolve together. For example, 
transition from feudalism into capitalism involved a massive change and economic transformation, 
just as from capitalism into communism and the other way around. These were transitions with 
substantial transformations. According to Blanchard (1997), transition in essence implies 
reallocation of resources to make economic transformation by removing the subsidies where, 
output is certainly expected to decline and cause disorganization that requires restructuring. As 
Kornai (2006) called it, transition in CEE was a unique great transformation involving the changes 
in all spheres at an incredible speed. Transition strategies varied across post-communist countries 
in political, institutional and economic reforms. Svejnar (2002) distinguished two types of reforms: 
Type I, involving the dismantling of communist system, macroeconomic stabilization; and Type 
II, related to establishing the institutions for a market economy, and preparing the legal framework 
for the rule of law. What was, and still is, the ultimate aim of transition and transformation in CEE? 
What is the time frame, stages, orientation, criteria, target and destination? There is no consensus 
on where this transition is over. Scholars have a different view, each presenting their arguably 
sound reasons, mostly overlapping, and sometimes disagreeing. The most accepted indicator is 
membership in the EU. While this is taken as a more standard rule for the transition to be over, 
questions remain over regional development disparities and income differences between the 
member states, thus giving rise to other indicators. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) which has been 
monitoring the transition in CEE with reports since 1993, determined three stages along with 
their respective indicators as: i) emergency transition, ii) intermediate stage, and iii) advanced 
transition. The indicators of these stages included the measures of policy reforms implemented 
and their results. Later, the International Monetary Fund – IMF (1997) by then judged the 
transition process as working with reference to eight countries (the Baltic countries, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia). Its reference to working has been made to 
stabilization and adjustment programs, reform policies, controlling inflation, and economic 
growth (after a period of decline since 1990). Taking the same referred countries, Kornai (2006) 
argued that the aim or destination of transition was towards Western civilization, membership in 
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the EU respectively, where the eight countries mentioned did so in 2004. He took this as a 
timeframe of 10-15 years for the transition to be over, and reiterated (Kornai, 2012), that the 
direction in the destination of transition in CEE proves the superiority of capitalism, therefore 
the transformation that took and already is taking place in the rest, is the right direction of 
development and technological progress.  In the same spirit but broader terms, Lavinge (1999) 
considers the transition over when the CEE countries are integrated into the world economy, and 
this process goes through the stages of reintegration. The initial stage occurred out of 
disintegration as regional grouping such as agreements between the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), and the regrouping of CEE for accession process to the EU. The next 
stage is to participate in the global economy. After all, the end period of transition depends on 
those who judge it, and this makes the question somehow unanswerable. The grouping into CEE 
and CIS was also made by Roland (2001). The latter group lagged behind in reforms by 
introducing presidential reforms, while the former opted for parliamentary regimes similar to the 
Western Europe democracies. This reflected in different economic performance and transition 
towards the EU. However, China remained a dictatorship without democracy, avoided recession 
and experienced unprecedented economic growth, which is usually dismissed from comparative 
analysis with the CEE and CIS. This will be discussed later in a separate section.  
 As far as transition stages are concerned, Csaba (2004) sought to explain the CEE journey  
through the following: i) transition from plan to market; ii) harmonizing the legal framework,  
institutional design with the EU and open up to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); iii) adjustment 
process and criteria for accession; and iv) joining the EU. More or less, this is line with already 
mentioned criteria about the end of transition, where some gave a time frame, target or destination, 
type of reforms, regrouping, collapse of one block in the East and joining the other in the West of 
Europe, and so on. All this in the name of transition. Nevertheless, leaving the block or the EU 
such as Brexit has also become popular as transition. This deserves a separate attention within this 
section.  
The UK joined the EEC in 1973, driven by the interest to be part of the European common 
market. As the time went on, the EEC became simply the EU, which apart from single market, 
was increasing the competencies in many areas in the UK’s affairs. The result of such an 
“overrule” led to Euroscepticism and consequently to Brexit. What are the causes and 
implications for the EU and the UK?  
Among many causes of the “leave” vote, was the caught up with the right wing populism, 
nationalism, fragmentation, loss of control over former colonies and immigration of their 
workers to the UK. Internal problems became a source to lay a blame on externalities such as 
the rule from Brussels or the EU. The “leave” campaign exploited this among lower classes of 
British voters or the social fragmentation (Bachman and Sidaway, 2016). Using individual data 
from “Understanding Society” as the UK’s largest database of households, Albrese et al. (2019) 
found that those who voted for “leave” were largely of older age, white ethnicity, less educated, 
less likely to use smartphones, were less healthier and receiving social benefits. This matches 
the hypothesis made by Bachman and Sidaway (2016) as if native English were “tired” of 
immigrants and they wrongly thought that leaving the EU may be the choice to their 
dissatisfaction. It was also shown that the Labour Party supporters were more likely to vote 
“remain” as opposed to Conservatives who more supported the “leave”. But the political engine 
and champion that exploited the situation for Brexit was the UK Independent Party (UKIP) and 
its figurehead Nigel Farage. Proponents of Brexit assumed the UK will resume a greater 
international role after being freed up from the rule of Brussels, in what the Prime Minister 
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Theresa May had promised as “Global Britain.” Glencross and McCourt (2018) questioned this 
new global role while the UK departs the EU. The new opportunity ahead was tested just months 
after the referendum results were announced, when Mrs May headed a trade delegation to India, 
a large and fast growing economy, for a free trade agreement (FTA). The Indian officials 
reportedly complained that the movement of goods and services cannot be separated from the 
movement of people. This came as a backlash to Mrs May who in 2010-2016 was Home 
Secretary that implemented the reduction in the number of visas for international students, 
Indians in particular. That is how immigration concerns as one of the major causes leading to 
Brexit are being faced with during the transition period as a conditionality for the “Global 
Britain.” It served as a lesson to Switzerland as a non-EU member, whose voters on 27.09.2020 
rejected the restrictions on free movement of people from the EU by nearly 62%.   
One of the key areas of concern after Brexit was the trade with the EU and reestablishing 
border controls, which rises the costs of logistic and freight forwarding companies. Tielmann 
and Schierek (2017) analyzed potential impact of 107 logistic companies and found strong 
negative impact on both sides, but more for the UK and less for the EU. In this way, as in many 
sectors, Brexit will have more negative effects at home and less to the EU with some cases 
unaffected. Now, the UK has come to renegotiate the terms of even this that attracted her to the 
union – the European single market and customs union, though not introducing harder borders, 
including the only land border with the Republic of Ireland through Northern Ireland, which 
would continue to remain under the influence of certain rules and standards (Prescot et al., 2020).  
The first immediate impact was its result of anticipated perceptions and feelings what is 
about to happen. There were already warning signs if the outcome would be to leave the EU. At 
the forefront of concerns was the economy, international trade and finance respectively. The 
immediate impact was felt in the UK banks recording a drop in stock prices in the short-run once 
the referendum results were announced. The drop was more severe than in the case of Lehman 
Brothers filing for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. At the same time, the share of EU banks 
in the UK became more concentrated (Schiereck et al., 2016). Breinlich et al. (2020) estimated 
that from 2016 referendum to March 2019, there has been 17% outward FDI by the UK firms to 
the EU states, with no effect to the rest of the world, and less 9% by the EU investment projects 
towards the UK. In line with them, Mold (2018) had found that it did not affect much to various 
parts of the world, e.g. in East Africa, and therefore argued that this would not lead to decrease 
in investment but rather make the region to increase efforts for a closer regional integration as a 
lesson from Europe of disintegration or Brexit. 
Transition in CEE is known when it started, and can be measured by various indicators 
when it is over, e.g. membership in the EU. But when is the transition over in the UK after 
Brexit? Nominally, it has a very precise date, i.e. 31.12.2020, but that is exactly when the real 
transition begins. Its course, implications and target or destination is not yet known as it is an 
ongoing process. Transition out of the EU or Brexit is different, but also has some similarities 










Time is an essential indicator in distinguishing between transformation and transition. In 
politics both can happen at the same time for a short period until the one party system is replaced 
by pluralism and the first elections are held. The ongoing competition between political parties 
thereafter is not transition but evolution which happens anywhere in the world as society and 
technology progresses, even in the time of stabilization which does not imply a constant state but 
steadily evolving. 
 
3.1. Similarities and differences between post-communist transition and Brexit 
The course of real transition in CEE depended, among others, from initial conditions, 
which in most parts was associated with economic recession and civil wars. By no means can this 
be compared to the transition of Brexit, despite both cases being transition. The UK is well 
prepared even before that real transition begins, and is likely to maintain political and economic 
stability, thus the name transition after 31.12.2020 onwards from the EU, let us say ten years, in 
principle, may only have a literal meaning. Otherwise, it is a wholly different story from transition 
in CEE. Another difference is that transition in CEE was considerably an uncontrolled experiment, 
as opposed to Brexit whose control and preparation on what is about to happen began even before 
the transition took place. 
Transition in CEE is referred to in the course of transformation, while in Brexit before it 
effectively happened. There has been lack of theories from communism to capitalism, something 
which in the UK made it aware upon embarking in a kind of transition to witness the emergence 
of various theories on transition before it actually takes place. The UK is getting out of the block 
(EU) as a single country. The CEE has seen the fall of an entire block with most countries 
embarking on transition to the EU on individual basis, with some in the Western Balkans still in 
the process to join and few (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia being 
farther away, if any). Brexit came as a result of referendum or the vote by the people. In CEE also 
by the people but in the form of revolutions which made the communist leaders give way. Table 





Table 1: Common and different features of transition: CEE countries and UK compared 
Indicator CEE Brexit 
Cause Result Cause Result 









Results of the 
June 23rd 2016 
Referendum 
Evolutionary 




Fall of Berlin Wall, 
1990 – 2004 
CIS countries still 
in transition 
June 23rd 2016 
– December 
31st 2020 
Real transition from 
2021 onwards 
Target Membership in the 
EU 
10 states became 
members 
Withdrawing 
from the EU 
Redefining relations 
with each EU member 
Politics Fall of communism 
and one party 
system; 





countries and  




towards the EU 
Resigning of 
government; 
Risk of breakup of the 
UK in case of next 
Scottish independence 
referendum 
Economics Lack of theories 



















trade towards the 
West 
Geographical 
proximity to the 




FTAs with all 
EU members 
separately 
Looking for FTAs 
globally, primarily in 
the British 
Commonwealth 
Privatization Large scale 
privatization of 
state ownership; 
Free entry and exit 





High social costs 
 
Economic research outside Marxist and communist system, was restricted or even banned 
in CEE, but encouraged in the UK, thus leading to diversification of knowledge and expertise 
which was and still is positive for the theories of transition in the case of Brexit, and that may be 
the reason why the UK was better prepared for transition from knowledge point of view, not 
necessarily from the level of economic development. Transition was seen as a hope and with 
euphoria in CEE but it led to disappointment in the short to medium term. The earlier experience 
and lesson from the CEE had warned the UK that transition must be taken with caution. 
The masses of people often cannot be convinced to follow the right path by democratic 
means, thus some restrictions and oppression is applied to keep them under control from potential 
harmful disorder of too much freedom leading to chaos. This is more applicable to historically less 
advanced societies aspiring to catch up or even beat advanced ones through alternative models as 
it happened with the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and cultural communist revolution in China 
associated with the red terror. In this respect, oppression works for the progress. However, it must 
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rely on harming and destroying others, which is inhuman that has culminated in two world wars 
and countless others throughout history. Does the UK needs to discipline, scold or punish the 
people for its “wrong” vote or choosing the “wrong” path? There are already complains in Scotland 
which voted in favor of remaining in the EU by a landslide of 62%, thus getting Brexit against the 
Scottish will. The outcome has generated the feeling amongst many Scots to have a second 
referendum for independence, and join the EU. This would establish the second land border with 
the EU of what would remain as the UK, between Scotland and England respectively.  
   
3.2. Britain and Brexit in historical perspective 
At the time when the UK was bidding to join the EU, many in Britain saw the group as the 
bunch of losers in both world wars. Great Britain was the largest empire in history by landmass 
which at the height of its expansion went to clash with German empire over Belgium’s neutrality 
and win in WWI as well as WWII. The name “Great” does coincide with what actually Britain 
became known as colonial empire, but that is the name given the island by ancient Romans. As a 
matter of fact, Small Britain is a peninsula in western France. So when the Romans invaded the 
territory of today’s France, they named that peninsula as Britannia (Bretagne in modern French), 
and in the 1st century A.D. after establishing the Roman province of Britain (today’s England and 
Wales), they named the first as Britannia Minor (Small Britain) and the latter as Britannia Major 
(Great Britain). That is just a reminder to those who still wrongly may think that the Great Britain 
got her name after massive colonial power.   
 Belgium preserved as a “buffer zone” between France, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK became the house of the EU, from which the UK withdrew (a transition from sympathy and 
fanatical defense to aversion), thus fearing the rule from Brussels which in the past it went to 
protect her from German hegemony. Although the sources provide evidence about the profile of 
those who voted to “leave” where majority appear as less educated and liberal, there is no doubt 
that amongst many British, the nostalgia of her greatness past, including the modern one from both 
world wars, was deeply rooted in their minds and thus might have affected the outcome of the 
2016 referendum to leave, including here the aversion of the rule from Brussels of Belgium whom 
the UK had to defend. One cannot judge such a choice (to leave the EU) as not the right behavior 
or choice. The history of empires is that of the evolution or rising and falling. Some may 
unsuccessfully try the revival such as Benito Mussolini for Italy in reference to ancient Roman 
empire, or Adolph Hitler’s dream to create a thousand year lasting Reich, Vladimir Putin’s sorrow 
describing the fall of the Soviet Union as the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century (what about 
two world wars?!) and that he would reverse the failure only if he could, then, Reccep Taip 
Erdogan’s intentions (and commitment) to reestablish a kind of Sultanate and new Ottoman 
Empire, and so on. Genghis Khan Mongol Empire was the largest contiguous and most ferocious 
one in history. Mongolia today is a third world country of just over three million inhabitants 
sandwiched between Russia and China. Certainly, it has given up the greatness past for any future 
imperial ambition, but this is being pushed for by her southern neighbor whom the Mongols had 
invaded in the Middle Age, China respectively. Just as empires rise and fall, so do their factors 
behind them change or evolve such as demographics, landmass, natural resources and climate, 
industrial revolution and technological innovation, capital, and military might. And they are not 
all of it for conquest and domination. COVID-19, originating and alleged to have been engineered 
in China, has emerged as a super weapon on a global scale, after which someone may come out as 
victorious, but hopefully this inhuman factor will be defeated soon by humanity along with 
potential future pandemics.       
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3.3. Transition and transformation: towards a more general and standard theory  
As discussed earlier, transition and transformation in economics are ambiguous terms. It is 
not clear where one or another ends. It was this unclear view as where the transition will be over, 
especially among different countries which Seliger (2002) questioned its use synonymously with 
transformation. Transformation is seen as an evolutionary process which in CEE happened in a 
revolutionary way, but the timeframe to reach a destination or target differed from country to 
country. Why? It was more spontaneous rather than a controlled experiment. Brexit is a controlled 
process right from the beginning, even a little before it happened.   
An example, and perhaps the best available one, is economic transformation with no 
political transition. China experienced a profound economic transformation, but rarely has anyone 
judged it as a transition as long as it maintained the communist rule to the present day. If in the 
view of Nolan (1995) China rose during the 1990s and Russia fell in economic terms once the 
latter initiated a transition to an open market economy and democracy, then where is the transition 
to democracy in China?  The Chinese style reforms which did not allow the Western policy 
recommendations, namely those of the Washington Consensus, an alternative transition, 
transformation and capitalism of gradualist approach which worked more effectively (Ahrens and 
Jünemann, 2010). Could such a pattern of transformation and experience work for better in CEE 
which introduced the Western style democracy, thus making transition of growth and not of 
recession? Did they need to copy China’s approach or apply an alternative to what they 
implemented? Instead of the Washington Consensus, the CEE countries were in a better position 
to adopt the alternative that was available to their doorstep they wanted to join and actually are 
joining, i.e. the social market economy model. The outcome of such an alternative of transition, if 
implemented from the beginning, could have been different, probably with more positive result 
from what they actually experienced (Matoshi and Mulaj, 2019).  
Transition does not imply any major and fast transformation in the UK, while in the CEE 
both are often understood synonymously or one conditioned by the other, e.g. the beginning of 
transition marks the starting point of transformation, and when the transformation ends and the 
countries have fully fledged market economies and joined the EU, the transition is considered over. 
When the scale of this indicator reaches the point as complete, the transition process is considered 
over, though this may be disputed. For example, Romania and Bulgaria were much behind in 
development than Croatia but joined the EU earlier. If membership in the EU marks the end of 
transition or reaching the target, then why leaving the EU is also referred to as transition?  
 
4. Conclusion and remarks 
 
Transition economics may no longer be reserved for a region of the world or a process 
from one particular economic system (communism) to another one (capitalism), therefore, it 
should be integrated into a general theory of evolution, transition and transformation by 
considering a merger of the Washington Consensus, the Beijing Consensus and the Brussels 
Consesus. The  government made the UK to join the EU in 1973, and in 2016 it was the people’s 
vote who got it out. Brexit is a sof transition or evolution, welcomed with joy by those who voted 
in its favor as their cause won. Following the immediate implications of withdrawal at national 
level, the outcome has scared the rest of EU members whose intentions to withdraw from the union 
paused as they are looking how the UK would fare after Brexit. The Euroscepticism culminating 
in the Brexit as the first exmple was being immediately used as a propaganda inside and outside 
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the UK that other members may follow suit such as France (Frexit), Greece (Grexit), the 
Netherlands (Nexit), Denmark (Danexit) and so on, all of which associating their portmanteau with 
the borrowed term “exit” from English. Now, these countries have the opportunity to learn a lesson 
and think more carefully from either loaned “exit” or employ their own language translation of the 
term, for other reasons to leave the EU apart from Brexit. The main experience and lesson to be 
learned is from the quote by Churchill that, if “democracy is the worst form of government except 
for all the others that have been tried”, then the British voters, as the scholars complain, appear to 
have chosen the wrong path through Brexit. An independence of Scotland from the UK as a move 
to join the EU would be even a worse option. If Brexit has caused more harm to the UK than to 
the EU, so will Scotland be made worse off as it would establish a new land border with the EU, 
and that is England or the current main and most dependent trading partner. This kind of rerouting 
the journey to the EU through independence would make transition in the British Isles similar to 
much of the CEE or post-communist countries.  
Despite the lesson learned from the CEE, there is still a misunderstanding or misuse of the 
term transition. January 1st 2021 will be the first day of true transition in the UK. This kind of 
evolutionary transition that is about to begin will neither lead to any major economic 
transformation nor to disruption. Given that Britain as an island is located in the middle of, or 
surrounded by, developed parts of the EU (Benelux, Denmark, northwestern Germany, northern 
France and the Republic of Ireland), it is likely that the latter block will perform better 
economically in the short to medium-run due to their integration benefits. In this respect, it remains 
a task for future research as the time goes on, to be seen what transformation will bring about in 
terms of general economic theory, and an answer to the popular and somehow boring question of 
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